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In 1972 Harsanyi and Selten characterized a one parameter asymmetric Nash solu-
tion. In this note I do the analog for the Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) solution. Replacing
Symmetry with a restricted version of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in the
set of axioms that lead to the KS solution, I characterize an asymmetric version of that
solution that depends only on one parameter.
1 Introduction
In 1950 Nash solved the ﬁrst two person cooperative bargaining problem: “The economic
situations of monopoly versus monopsony,of state trading between two nations,and of
negotiation between employer and labor union may be regarded as bargaining problems”.
Generally,the primitives are: a set that describes the feasible outcomes of the bargaining,
the disagreement point -an element of the set that is the outcome if no agreement is reached-
and a function -the solution F- that assigns to each bargaining problem an outcome,a point
in the set. The main issue in the ﬁeld is characterizing solutions: state certain desirable
properties that F should satisfy (the axioms) and ﬁnd the unique functional form such that
F satisﬁes the axioms if and only if it has that functional form.
Nash’s classic result is that under certain axioms there is a unique solution to the bar-
gaining problem. However,in the characterization he used the axiom of Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) which was later criticized because it failed to take into account
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1important features of the bargaining sets. Apart from this shortcoming,IIA is a reasonable
axiom,so I will deﬁne Restricted IIA,a weaker axiom than IIA that partially overcomes its
criticisms.
In 1975 Kalai and Smorodinsky noted that Nash’s solution,in addition to being based
on the problematic IIA,failed to satisfy certain properties they felt were desirable. Conse-
quently,they postulated a new set of axioms and characterized a new solution.
Another important step in the ﬁeld was given in 1972 by Harsanyi and Selten. They re-
laxed Symmetry -one of the properties used by both Nash (1950) and Kalai and Smorodinsky
(1975)- from the set of axioms that leads to the Nash solution and,adding Strong Individual
Rationality,found a one parameter class of asymmetric Nash solutions. Since then,some
objections to Symmetry (Sym) have been raised. In particular,if the bargaining problem
is interpreted as a robust representation of some more complicated non-cooperative game,
Sym becomes a problematic axiom. In this setting,several features of the original situation
may not be modeled in the problem. Imposing Sym can then mean,for example,assuming
equality of bargaining skill between the parties (Harsanyi,1977). 1 Hence,if in a bargaining
situation within a family it is the case that the man and the woman do not have the same
bargaining power,assuming Sym is unreasonable. Since,in fact,predictions based on sym-
metric solutions disagree with the empirical evidence on bargaining problems within families,
Dasgupta (1993,p.342) argues against Sym. Thus,allowing for asymmetric solutions makes
the theory more ﬂexible.
Moreover,within the class of asymmetric solutions,one parameter families of solutions
are important for at least two reasons. First,if it is known both that a solution belongs to a
one parameter family and what the outcome dictated by the solution is in a certain problem,
it is likely that the solution can be identiﬁed. Put diﬀerently,it is likely that the outcome
in any other problem can be computed. This condition is not satisﬁed by large families of
solutions: it may well be the case that a continuum of solutions within a large family would
yield a given outcome. If this is the case,knowing the outcome in a problem is not very
informative about the outcomes in other problems. Second,when a bargaining problem is
just one stage of a complicated model,as in the literature on unemployment surveyed by
Azariadis (1979),an easy-to-co mpute solution is needed. A one parameter class of solutions
is likely to be simple.
If a solution is interpreted as the outcome an arbitrator would choose,IIA seems reason-
able,for it is equivalent to requiring that the arbitrator’s choices satisfy the Weak Axiom of
1Of course, if all the relevant information to the problem is contained in the bargaining set, there is
nothing unspeciﬁed, in particular, there is no such thing as bargaining power.
2Revealed Preference. However,if cooperative baragining theory is about how agents actually
bargain,and not about “rational” arbitration,the axioms used by Kalai and Smorodinsky
are more adequate than those used by Nash. Then,the criticisms to Sym and the need
of simple and identiﬁable solutions call for a one parameter asymmetric Kalai-Smorodinsky
(KS) solution. Nevertheless,relaxing Symmetry from the set of axioms that leads to the
KS solution does not yield the desired result: Peters and Tijs (1985) showed that,given
the outcome in one problem,there are more than continuum many solutions that satisfy
all of KS axioms -exept for Sym- that would yield that outcome. So,to characterize the
one parameter class of solutions,I will use the axiom of Restricted IIA which preserves the
desirable features of IIA,and overcomes some of its problems.
As by products of this work I get three new characterizations of the KS solution that do
not rely on Symmetry. Also,two of the characterizations do not depend on Scale Invariance
either. That is,I recover those two properties from seemingly unrelated axioms. This work
will shed some light on the classiﬁcation of continuous solutions,an issue that,according
to Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975),would lead to a better understanding of the bargaining
problem. Finally,I extend my work to non-convex problems and address the issue of more
than two players.
2 Preliminaries
As is standard,I denote a two person bargaining problem, or simply a problem, by a set
S ⊆ R2 such that 0 ∈ S. The usual interpretation is that S is the set of all utility proﬁles
that a bargaining process could possibly yield,and 0 is the disagreement point.
For all x,y ∈ R2: x ≥ y if and only if xi ≥ yi for i =1 ,2; x>yif and only if xi ≥ yi for
i =1 ,2 and xj >y j for some j. Finally, x  y if and only if xi >y i for i =1 ,2.
Is a yt h a tS is comprehensive if y ∈ S whenever x ∈ S and x ≥ y ≥ 0. S is said to
be strictly comprehensive if it is comprehensive and there exists a z ∈ S such that z  y
whenever x,y ∈ S and x>y≥ 0. If a set is strictly comprehensive its boundary in R2
++
does not have any vertical or horizontal ﬂats.
The comprehensive hull of a set S ⊆ R2 is the smallest comprehensive set containing
S. I will denote it comp(S). The convex comprehensive hull of a set S ⊆ R2, cch(S),is the
smallest convex and comprehensive set containing S. I denote by Σ the class of compact
and comprehensive sets S ⊆ R2
+ for which there is an x ∈ S such that x  0.T h es e to fa l l
convex elements of Σ is denoted Σc.
Any function that chooses for each set S ∈ Σ an element of S is called a solution.A
3generic solution is denoted by F. For any set S ∈ Σ, I deﬁne:
ai(S) ≡ max{xi :( x1,x 2) ∈ S},i=1 ,2
P(S) ≡{ x ∈ S : y>x⇒ y/ ∈ S} and WP(S) ≡{ x ∈ S : y  x ⇒ y/ ∈ S}
For any problem S, a(S) is the “utopia” point,the utility proﬁle in which each individual
achieves the greatest utility level he can get from the bargaining problem. P(S) and WP(S)
are the sets of strongly and weakly Pareto Optimal utility allocations.
3 Background and Motivation
Nash (1950) required that his solution satisﬁed:
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA): For all S,T ∈ Σ, if S ⊆ T and
F(T) ∈ S hold,then F(S)=F(T).
Pareto Optimality (PO): For all S ∈ Σ,F(S) ∈ P(S).
Symmetry (Sym): Given e : R2 → R2 deﬁned by e((x1,x 2)) = (x2,x 1),we must have
F(e(S)) = e(F(S)) for all bargaining problems S.
Scale Invariance (SI)2: For all T ∈ Σ and aﬃne σ : R2 → R2, we have that F(T)=x
iﬀ F({σ(t)| t ∈ T})=σ(x).
As is well known,Nash’s result is that there is one and only one function N that satisﬁes
these axioms on Σc. For any S, N(S) maximizes the mapping x → x1x2 on S.
If cooperative baragining is about rational arbitration,IIA is a desirable axiom. However,
if the theory is about how agents actually bargain,IIA is less acceptable. 3 Nash’s motivation
for IIA assumed that the geometry of the bargaining sets involved did not aﬀect what would






















The “un-fairness” of the choice dictated by IIA in this example comes from the fact that
although in passing from T to S individual 2 sees his best choices disappear,and individual
1 does not,the solution is unchanged. It is possible to overcome this problem by weakening
IIA in the following way:
2In the bargaining literature, a problem is usually deﬁned as a pair (S,d) where d ∈ S is called the
disagreement point. In my formulation, d =0is without loss of generality since I conﬁne attention to Scale
Invariant solutions -for which translation of the origin is irrelevant-.
3Although Nash (1950) justiﬁed IIA for the case where the solution was interpreted as the outcome of a
bargaining process, he said that the interpretation of the axiom was “more complicated” than that of the
others he used.
4Restricted IIA (RIIA): For all T,S ∈ Σ, if S ⊆ T, F(T) ∈ S and βa(S)=a(T) for
β ∈ R++ hold,then F(T)=F(S).
In contrast with IIA,Restricted IIA takes into account some features of the problems that it
relates. In particular,RIIA requires that a2/a1, a proxy for the relative individual standings,
remains constant. Consider two problems S,T such that S ⊆ T. It is easy to imagine that
if the relative standings of the parties does not change (when passing from T to S)a n d
the original choice remains available in the smaller set,they would choose again the same
point. That is precisely RIIA. The requirement that a2/a1 does not change between two sets
makes the allowed variation (in the problems to be related) small,and so one of the most
common criticisms to IIA is partially overcome. Although RIIA is a new axiom,the idea
of controlling for the utopia point in an IIA-type axiom is not new: Roth (1977a) and Imai
(1983) use RIIA with β =1 . Also,since RIIA is weaker than IIA,it is satisﬁed by the Nash
solution. In Section 4 I give alternative axioms that,taking for granted Pareto Optimality,
imply RIIA.
In addition to the objections to IIA,some criticisms were raised directly against Nash’s
solution. In particular,Kalai and Smorodinsky argued that in any two problems S and T
such that S ⊆ T, ai(T)=ai(S) and aj(T) ≥ aj(S), player j h a sg o o dr e a s o nt od e m a n d
that he gets more in problem T than he gets in S, and Nash’s solution fails to satisfy that
requirement. To overcome these problems,they introduced the following axiom:
Individual Monotonicity (IM): if S ⊆ T, ai(T)=ai(S) and aj(T) ≥ aj(S) then
Fj(T) ≥ Fj(S) for i,j ∈{ 1,2},i= j.
Kalai and Smorodinsky proved that the unique solution that satisﬁes SI,Sym,PO and IM











Note that while KS does not satisfy IIA,it does satisfy RIIA. Thus,IM and RIIA are
compatible.
The criticisms to both IIA and Nash’s solution and the acceptability of IM make the KS
type of solutions compelling. Moreover,the criticisms to Sym -presented in the Introduction-
and the need of simple and identiﬁable solutions call for a deﬁnition and characterization of
a one parameter asymmetric KS solution.
The ﬁrst step is to deﬁne a new asymmetric one parameter function that generalizes the
KS solution in a natural way. For notational simplicity,let

x ∈ R2
+ : x2 = ∞x1

denote the
y axis throughout. Then,for λ ∈ R+ ∪{∞ }deﬁne what Thomson (1994) calls the weighted
5KS solution by Dλ(S) ≡

x ∈ R2




∩ WP(S). The KS solution is nested
within {Dλ : λ ∈ R+ ∪{ ∞ } } : D1 = KS. However,for λ =1the solution Dλ is not Pareto
Optimal.4 Hence,by taking the Lexicographic extension of Dλ,I deﬁne a new one-parameter
asymmetric solution that satisﬁes PO. I call it the asymmetric KS solution: for all S ∈ Σ
and some λ ∈ R+ ∪{ ∞ }
KSλ(S) ≡{ x ∈ R
2
+ : x ≥ Dλ(S)}∩P(S)
The second step,which is my aim in this paper,is to characterize the solution. As
was noted earlier,relaxing Sym from the KS set of axioms is not enough,since this leads
to the class of individually monotonic solutions.5 The problem is that there are too many
individually monotonic solutions: given F(S) for any S ∈ Σc,there are more than continuum
many individually monotonic solutions that would yield F(S) as an outcome.
4T h e R e s u l t s
4.1 Convex bargaining problems
I will just prove the only if parts of the propositions,the if parts are straightforward.
4.1.1 The Asymmetric Kalai-Smorodinsky solution KSλ
If a non dictatorial solution satisﬁes PO and SI on Σc,it can not satisfy both IM and
IIA. However,in this section I prove that on the domain of convex sets,IM and RIIA are
compatible,and characterize KSλ using a tight set of axioms.
Theorem 1 A solution F satisﬁes SI, IM, PO, and RIIA on Σc if and only if there exists
a unique λ ∈ R+ ∪ {∞} such that for all S ∈ Σc
F(S)=KSλ(S) ≡{ x ∈ R
2
+ : x ≥ Dλ(S)}∩P(S)
4For λ =1 , Dλ(cch({(1,1)})) =( 1 ,1) the only Pareto Optimal point in cch({(1,1)}).
5Peters and Tijs (1985) proved that a solution F satisﬁed IM, SI and PO if and only if it had an associated
monotonic curve θ :[ 1 ,2] → cch({(1,1)}) such that for all s,t ∈ [1,2] if s ≤ t, holds, then θ(s) ≤ θ(t) and
θ1(s)+θ2(s)=s hold. Then, for each solution F satisfying the axioms, there exists an individually monotonic
solution πθ such that πθ(S) is the unique point of P(S) that lies in {θ(t);t ∈ [1,2]} for all S ∈ Σc such that
a(S)=( 1 ,1).
6Proof: Let ∆ ≡

x ∈ R2
+ : x1 + x2 ≤ 1

.G i v e n F(∆),there is a unique λ ∈ R+ ∪{ ∞ }








| y ∈ S
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Now let asλ(T) ≡ Dλ(T)1 + Dλ(T)2, and U ≡{ asλ(T)y | y ∈ ∆}. Then SI implies
that F(U)=asλ(T)F(∆) = Dλ(T). Let X ≡ cch({Dλ(T),(1,0),(0,1)}). Since a(U)=
asλ(T)a(X) and X is contained in U,RIIA implies that F(X)=Dλ(T). Applying IM twice
Ig e tF(T) ≥ Dλ(T). Then, PO yields F(T)=KSλ(T),and by SI, F(S)=KSλ(S).
I have managed to preserve desirable axioms like IM,PO and SI,and by adding a version
of IIA that overcomes its major criticisms,I get a simple,one parameter asymmetric KS
solution. As desired,given the choice KSλ assigns to any strictly comprehensive S ∈ Σc, λ
can be identiﬁed,and the solutions in any problem can be found.
Note that Nash’s solution, F(S)=0 and LexEg(S)={x : x ≥

x ∈ R2
+ : x2 = x1

∩
WP(S)}∩P(S) fail to satisfy,respectively,IM,PO and SI while they satisfy the rest of the
axioms. An individually monotonic solution that does not satisfy RIIA is H(S)={x : x ≥ 
x ∈ R2





4.1.2 Three New Characterizations of the KS Solution
I now use the results of the previous section and give three new characterizations of the KS
solution that do not rely on Sym. Moreover,the last two do not depend on SI either. For
my ﬁrst characterization I need to deﬁne continuity.
Continuity (C): for all sequences {Sn}∞
1 ,S n ∈ Σ for all n,such that Sn converges to S
in the Hausdorﬀ topology, F(Sn) converges to F(S)



























7Proposition 2 A solution F satisﬁes SI, IM, PO, C and RIIA on Σc if and only if for all
S ∈ Σc
F(S)=KS(S)
Proof: For any S ∈ Σc,pick a sequence of strictly comprehensive sets {Sn}∞
1 , that converges
to S. Since for all n, WP (Sn)=P (Sn), F(Sn)=Dλ(Sn) for some ﬁxed λ ∈ R+ ∪{ ∞ }.
Since F is continuous, F(S)=Dλ(S). Then PO and the fact that Dλ satisﬁes PO only for
λ =1yield F(S)=D1(S) ≡ KS(S).
Apart from giving a new characterization of the KS solution,this Proposition addresses
the issue of continuity of solutions studied by Kalai and Smorodinsky. In Σs the domain of
strictly comprehensive problems, KSλ is continuous for all λ, so the requirement of KSλ being
continuous is binding only on Σc\Σs, a “small” set. In the sets where KSλ is discontinuous,
it is assigning to some player a payoﬀ strictly bigger than that Dλ would give.
For the next result,recall the axiom of Restricted Monotonicity.
Restricted Monotonicity (IM2):I fS ⊆ T and a(S)=a(T), then F(S) ≤ F(T).
Peters and Tijs (1985) showed that a solution F satisﬁes IM if and only if it satisﬁes IM2.
Now,IM can be interpreted as follows: if the relative standings of the two individuals do
not change from one problem to another and the set of possible outcomes is enlarged,they
should both get more in the larger problem. I now deﬁne a similar notion:
General Monotonicity (GM):I fS ⊆ T and a(S)=βa(T) for some β ∈ R++, then
F(S) ≤ F(T).
The interpretation is the same as the one just given for IM2. To show that GM implies IM,
set β =1in GM and use the Peters and Tijs’s result of the last paragraph. The following
lemma shows that,taking PO for granted,RIIA can be derived from an axiom similar to
IM. In addition,it provides my second new characterization of the KS solution,this time
based on GM. Note that SI is not needed.
Proposition 3 As o l u t i o nF satisﬁes GM and POon Σc if and only if for all S ∈ Σc
F(S)=KS(S)
Proof: For any S ∈ Σc,PO implies F (comp({KS(S)})) = KS(S). Then,GM yields
F (S) ≥ KS(S) ∈ P (S) and PO completes the proof.
Raiﬀa (1953) discusses the KS function as a possible solution when interpersonal com-
parisons of utility are allowed. The following axiom and the results that follow give a
characterization of KS in that spirit.
8Relative Monotonicity (RM): For all S,T ∈ Σc, if S ⊆ T and aj(T)/aj(S) ≥
ai(T)/ai(S) hold,then Fj(T)/Fj(S) ≥ Fi(T)/Fi(S) for i,j ∈{ 1,2},i= j must hold.
RM states that given two problems,if individual j improves his situation more than i in
passing from situation S to T,he should get relatively more in T than in S. Note that this
axiom is similar to IM. Before the third characterization of KS,I derive RIIA from RM and
WPO.
Lemma 4 If a solution F satisﬁes WPOand RM on Σ, it also satisﬁes RIIA
Proof:P i c ka n yS, T ∈ Σc such that S ⊆ T, F(T) ∈ S and βa(S)=a(T) for β ∈ R++.
Then, βa(S)=a(T) and RM applied twice imply that F(S)=γF(T) for some γ>0,so
WPO implies F(T)=F(S).
I now give my third characterization of KS. As before,SI is not needed .
Proposition 5 As o l u t i o nF satisﬁes POand RM on Σc if and only if for all T ∈ Σc
F(T)=KS(T)
Proof: For any set T ∈ Σc there exists x ∈ T such that x  0, so there exists a β>0 for
which S = βcomp(a(T)) ⊆ T. PO implies that F(S)=βa(T),so RM applied twice yields
F(T)=γa(T) for some γ>0.POthen yields F(T)=KS(T).
Since the KS solution is Symmetric and Scale Invariant,I have recovered Sym and SI
from other axioms that do not imply them directly.7
A few words about the signiﬁcance of these results are in order. Characterizations of
solutions in cooperative bargaining are meant to be in the utility space because of the use of
SI. Hence,if the primitives of a problem are monetary payoﬀs,bargaining theory cannot be
used. That is the reason why empirical applications (for example,testing if Nash’s solution
or the KS solution yield correct predictions) are forced to assume speciﬁc forms of utility
functions. Proposition 5 gives a characterization of the KS solution that does not assume
SI,so that applications can now use directly data on money to test predictions. Moreover,
RM can be reinterpreted as a comparison of relative monetary,and not utility,gains.
7A result of this kind was obtained by Roth (1977b). He recovered Pareto Optimality from other axioms.
94.2 Non-Convex Bargaining Problems
The assumption of convexity of the bargaining problem arises naturally if randomizations
between outcomes are allowed,even if the original problem is non-convex. However,ran-
domizations are not always allowed in bargaining problems,as in state trading between two
nations (Ok and Zhou,1997). Moreover,even if randomizations are permitted,the prob-
lem may be settled at a lottery,and the axioms that characterize the solution may only
be satisﬁed in expectation (Conley and Wilkie,1996). Hence,if I want the axioms to be
satisﬁed ex-post it is important to see how the results on the convex domain extend to Σ,
the non-convex domain. To do so,I ﬁrst introduce an axiom:
Strong Individual Rationality (SIR): For all S ∈ Σ,F(S)  0.
This axiom,used by both Roth (1977b) and Harsanyi and Selten (1972),states that if
there is some chance of beneﬁtting from bargaining,the outcome will leave both parties
strictly better oﬀ than in the no agreement situation. In particular,SIR rules out dictatorial
solutions. Harsanyi and Selten argued that since in any agreement the parties will choose
something greater than 0,eliminating that utility value for each agent should not change
the solution.
The ﬁrst result in this section is that three desirable axioms like SIR,PO and IM -that
KSλ satisﬁes for λ>0 in the convex domain- cannot be preserved in non convex sets.
Lemma 6 There does not exist a solution F that satisﬁes IM, POand SIR on Σ.
Proof: Suppose there exists such a solution F. Then,for any strictly comprehensive problem
S pick a point p ∈ P(S) such that p = F(S). Let X ≡ comp({p,(a1(S),0),(0,a 2(S))}).
Since P(X) ∩ R
2
++ = p,PO and SIR imply that F(X)=p. Apply IM twice and get
F(S) ≥ F(X)=p,so p ∈ P(S) implies F(S)=p,a contradiction.
Moreover,in the domain of non convex problems,the KSλ solution is not a function,
but a correspondence,so I will chararacterize Dλ. Since there are too many solutions that
satisfy WPO,IM and SI,the set of axioms needs to be strengthened in order to get a one
parameter class of solutions.
Proposition 7 A solution F satisﬁes SI,WPOand RM on Σ if and only there exists a
unique λ ∈ R+ ∪{ ∞ }such that for all S ∈ Σc
F(S)=Dλ(S)
10Proof:G i v e nF(∆) there exists a unique λ ∈ R+∪{∞}such that F(∆) = Dλ(∆). For any











| y ∈ S

. Since for some
p, Tp(S) ⊆ ∆ and a(Tp(S)) = 1
pa(∆), RM applied twice implies F(Tp(S)) = γDλ(∆). WPO
then implies F(Tp(S)) = Dλ(Tp(S)) and SI completes the proof.
5 Concluding Remarks
Given the criticisms to IIA,I have deﬁned a new axiom,a restricted version of IIA (RIIA)
that overcomes its major diﬃculties. It turned out that,as desired,this weaker version
of IIA is compatible with Individual Monotonicity (IM). Also,I derived RIIA from axioms
related to IM.
Since I was concerned with ﬁnding a one parameter asymmetric version of the KS solution,
I ﬁrst deﬁned Dλ, a non-Pareto Optimal asymmetric version of KS. Based on it I deﬁned
KSλ, the new one parameter asymmetric KS solution,and characterized it for the convex
domain using RIIA.
Also,I gave three new characterizations of KS. The axioms used in the characterizations
seem unrelated to Sym and Scale Invariance and both are recovered. It then seems that
there is much to be learnt from the relationships between the axioms that have been used in
the literature. Finally,I characterized Dλ on the non-convex domain.
For n>2 players,and λ ∈ (R+ ∪ {∞})
n−1,both Dλ and IM2 are easily deﬁned. Then,
Dλ can be characterized (for strictly comprehensive sets) following the steps of Theorem 1
using IM2 instead of IM. Like the KS solution,a limitation of the asymmetric KS solution
is that it requires a lexicographic extension to satisfy PO (see Thomson,1994). Then,the
characterization becomes too technical.
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